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Abstract: Intellectual property regimes necessarily create artificial scarcity leading to wastage, both by blocking follow-up 
research and impeding access to those who are not able to pay the full retail price. After revising the traditional arguments to 
hinder access to people’s intellectual labour, we examine why we should be more open to allow free-riding of inventive efforts, 
especially in cases where innovators have not secured the widest access to the fruits of their research. We do so by questioning 
the voluntariness involved in the consumption of objects of innovation, restating the positive social externalities that arise when 
wider access to the fruits of innovation is facilitated, and examining the eventual harms innovators face.
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Beneficiarse de los frutos inutilizados del trabajo intelectual ajeno
Resumen: Los regímenes de propiedad intelectual crean necesariamente una escasez artificial que conduce al despilfarro, tanto 
mediante el bloqueo de investigación derivada y al prohibir el acceso a aquellos que no son capaces de pagar el precio total de 
venta. Después de analizar los argumentos tradicionales para limitar el acceso al trabajo intelectual ajeno, examinaremos por 
qué debemos ser más abiertos en permitir el uso gratuito de los esfuerzos inventivos ajenos, especialmente en los casos en que 
los innovadores no han ofrecido el más amplio acceso a los frutos de sus investigaciones. Para este propósito cuestionaremos la 
voluntariedad involucrada en el consumo de los objetos de la innovación, mencionaremos las externalidades sociales positivas 
que surgen cuando se facilita un mayor acceso a los frutos de la innovación, y haremos un examen del tipo de daños que los 
innovadores eventualmente enfrentan.
Palabras clave: patentes, desperdicio, parasitismo, dominio público, beneficiarse del progreso científico
Colhendo os frutos não coletados do trabalho intelectual de outras pessoas 
Resumo: Os regimes de propriedade intelectual criam, necessariamente, escassez artificial, levando ao desperdício, tanto por 
meio do bloqueio de pesquisa de acompanhamento quanto pelo impedimento dreo acesso àqueles que não são capazes de pagar 
o preço comercial total. Após rever os argumentos tradicionais para dificultar o acesso ao trabalho intelectual, nós examinamos 
porque nós devemos ser mais abertos e permitir o parasitismo dos esforços inovadores, especialmente em casos no qual os 
inovadores não têm assegurado o acesso mais amplo aos frutos de sua pesquisa. Nós o fazemos por questionar a voluntariedade 
envolvida no consumo de objetos de inovação, reafirmando as externalidades sociais positivas que surgem quando o acesso 
mais amplo dos resultados da inovação é facilitado, e examinar a eventuais prejuízos que os inovadores possam enfrentar.
Palavras-chave: patentes, desperdício, parasitismo, domínio público, beneficiando de avanço científico
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Introduction 
Being able to enjoy the fruits of one’s labour is a 
right that is deeply rooted in the natural law tra-
dition(1). However, when defining exactly how 
much is entailed in the vague concept of “fruits 
of one’s labour”, opinions vary significantly. While 
some discount vast portions of the value of labour 
back to society(2), others consider this utterly as 
theft(3). Most people tend to not follow an ex-
treme position in this regard and place themselves 
somewhere between these two poles. Thus, we can 
observe a wide support of both the principle hold-
ing that workers are morally entitled to receive at 
least some benefit from their labour and the prin-
ciple stating that ownership does not morally en-
title to block every single type of unlicensed ben-
eficial usage.
In this article we concentrate our attention on one 
particular type of work: intellectual labour. We do 
so for a specific reason, intellectual workers are 
unable to grasp all (or even the majority of ) the 
opportunities their efforts yield to. Knowledge – 
the produce of the intellectual worker – is a public 
good, in the sense of being non-rivalrous in con-
sumption(4), therefore leading to virtually end-
less opportunities to do good or harm. Not even 
a highly morally conscious inventor with the most 
efficient sales strategies and research capacities is 
able to harvest all opportunities her inventions 
may lead to. It takes a significant amount of effort 
to survey the opportunities an invention gives rise 
to and it is prohibitively expensive to identify how 
much each potential customer is willing to pay 
for derived products. By nature, intellectual prop-
erty creates artificial scarcity und thus necessarily 
wastes opportunities – something highly problem-
atic from an ethical perspective if leading to avoid-
able suffering and death(5). This problem leads us 
to the question we dedicate this examination: Do 
we have a moral right to collect the fruits of the 
labour an inventor fails to collect? This question 
is of paramount importance in today’s knowledge 
economy as an affirmative answer could help to 
justify a moral obligation to opt for sales practices 
that ensure wider access to the benefits of scientific 
advancement and so alleviate suffering and im-
prove well-being. Private interests in earning prof-
its from innovation need to be rebalanced with 
public interests in access to innovation.
We attempt to answer this question by (i) identi-
fying what is there to collect, (ii) examining the 
natural law arguments supporting exclusivity, 
(iii) analysing the consequences of Lockean non-
wastage provisos applied to intangible goods, (iv) 
evaluating from an ethical perspective the differ-
ent forms of free-riding, and finalize by (v) draw-
ing some conclusions for current sales practices.
Uncollected fruits of labour
As the main incentive system allowing to collect 
the fruits of innovative efforts policymakers have 
established a worldwide system of intellectual 
property protection(6). Temporary exclusivity 
should give innovators who have made a market-
able invention available enough time to recoup 
reasonable research and development costs as well 
as gather some profits. By offering temporary ex-
clusivity society incentivizes inventors to disclose 
their knowledge, instead of relying on trade se-
crets. After exclusivity expires this knowledge be-
comes part of the public domain. This trade-off is 
referred to as the patent bargain(7).
The globalization of intellectual property regimes 
has made patents the predominant tool used to 
enable inventors to enjoy the fruits of their la-
bour(8). Briefly stated, the patent system allows 
inventors to apply for a temporary exclusive right, 
which following the Trade-related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Agreement (1994) lasts 20 
years in most jurisdictions (art. 33). Inventions 
should be novel, allow industrial application and 
involve an inventive step (non-obviousness) (art. 
27.1). Exclusivity also allows recouping significant 
sales and advertising expenses(9).
Due to their wide use and legal extensiveness, pat-
ents have become the most prominent target of 
criticism when discussing the negative effects of 
intellectual property regimes – especially in rela-
tion to access to patented medicines(6,10). For 
this reason we will use the example of patents in 
medicines throughout the paper, as these exem-
plify the high social costs of the system for society 
and the need to address systemic injustices(11). 
Patents as an innovation incentive tool bring 
about major justice problems when situated in a 
world with huge differences in purchasing power 
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and research capacity(12). While, as mentioned, it 
is difficult to collect all apples from an actual tree 
in one’s garden, it is practically impossible to col-
lect all the potential fruits of one’s intellectual la-
bour. When being encouraged to sell the fruits of 
innovation, even the most complex pricing strate-
gy will leave potential customers out. There will be 
always people who are able or willing to pay more 
than the cost price, but less then the sales price. 
The complexity involved is depicted in figure 1, 
illustrating three different sales practices A, B and 
C. Each one leads to the same amount of income, 
but the three leave a decreasing amount of poten-
tial users out (A<B<C). In the case the inventor 
has to collect the fruits of his labour by selling 
his invention on the market, it will be inevitable 
that some dead-weights occur, even when choos-
ing complex price-differentiations2. Now, we can 
imagine that a third party jumps in, identifies this 
dead-weight as waste and decides to serve those 
that where previously underserved by offering 
variants of the inventions that can be marketed or 
given away more cheaply. A number of potential 
users may welcome less luxurious variants of ob-
jects of innovation. 
Figure 1
Temporary exclusivity leads also to a second type 
of underuse of intellectual resources. Many inven-
tions have a potential for secondary usages. The 
marketed product is often designed to address one 
of the many possible usages of an invention. Ex-
clusive rights may hinder the possibility to make 
2 Price-differentiation means here charging higher prices to those 
who have more resources, and to those who have less, lower prices, 
in order to allow wider access to the objects of innovation and 
increase revenues.
full use of an invention by limiting alternative 
uses. Particularly open innovation advocates have 
underlined the importance of allowing and even 
encouraging user innovation as a key element for 
scientific and technological progress(13).
I continue my argument by examining if this third 
party has a right to utilize these unused or under-
used opportunities, by analysing the traditional 
justifications for exclusive rights on labour.
Intellectual property, natural rights and argu-
ments for denying access to one’s labour 
The natural right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labour 
is defended by a number of authors throughout 
several centuries – the most influential figure be-
ing John Locke. The English philosopher famous-
ly argued that by mixing labour with a tangible 
object one could rightfully claim ownership on 
that object(14: chap. v). Here we should distin-
guish between the two elements on which owner-
ship is claimed, the fruits of one’s labour and the 
material this labour is mixed with, consisting in 
an intangible element and a material object. In 
the case of tangible objects, we cannot detach the 
labour from the material it is mixed with (i.e. the 
improvement made on the object). Labour mu-
tates the materials with which it mixes with. By 
taking this fact in consideration, we can argue that 
claiming ownership on the object labour is mixed 
with, underlies practical necessities, as we cannot 
harvest the fruits of our labour without sufficient 
access to materials with which our labour was 
mixed with. 
The case of immaterial objects is different(15); we 
do not mutate the object we mixed labour with 
– we create a new object, although often with 
consequences for material and in some cases even 
immaterial objects. The same practical necessities 
for allowing ownership do not apply since other 
methods for harvesting the fruits of intellectual 
labour are conceivable. As a consequence, the link 
between owning the object and being able to en-
joy the fruits of one’s labour is not indispensable. 
In principle the fruits of intellectual labour can 
be enjoyed by means other than exclusive own-
ership(16). Good examples are prize systems that 
aim at compensating and incentivizing innovation 
without requiring exclusion from research and 
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end products. That such prize schemes, as often 
suggested for medicines, have not been institu-
tionalized is a failing per se, and not a legitimation 
for exclusion(17). This argument gains further 
support, if the objects of innovation are essential 
to fulfil human rights, such as improved seed va-
rieties for the right to food and medicines for the 
right to medicines(11). The fact that one’s right 
to enjoy the fruits of one’s labour has not been 
met, does not legitimize to hinder the fulfilment 
of other people’s rights(17). Under this line of rea-
soning, the human right to benefit from the ma-
terial interests of one’s intellectual work does not 
lead unconditionally to the often claimed right to 
own intellectual property,3 as a direct causal link 
is missing.4 Intellectual property is neither a suffi-
cient nor a strictly necessary condition for profits. 
Yet there might be some hesitations in giving 
out goods gratuitously. Considering Leo Strauss’ 
widely disputed interpretation of Locke(19), 
which goes against giving out something for free 
as it undermines the incentive to mix labour with 
assets and thus improving them, we still see one 
easy argument for bringing in an exception for the 
case of intellectual property in certain fields. The 
spirit of the Lockean property theory suggests that 
if people are able to harvest the fruits of their la-
bour, an especial incentive is created to encourage 
people to do more work and thus enlarge overall 
welfare. This reasoning vaguely implies that peo-
ple having assets for free are less prone to work. 
However, this argument allows room for the idea 
of unnecessary burden. A certain array of public 
and private goods has to be available for people 
to be able to start working more efficiently – as 
means of production and being productive(20). 
We recognize this with our idea of having basic 
needs fulfilled. Inventions can clearly help people 
to overcome unnecessary burdens. The free distri-
3 Article 27.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
only secures the protection of “moral and material interests” and 
therefore does not lead to the recognition of exclusive rights as 
the sole or necessary vehicle for the fulfilment of these interests. 
Different is the case of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (2000), which mandates the protection of 
intellectual property (art. 17.2). However, the European Charter 
does not perceive property rights as absolute and reserves the right to 
regulate the use of property according to general interests (art. 17.1).
4 Intellectual property allows only some researchers (those who can 
cover the necessary expenses) to enjoy the fruits of some of their 
labour (not all research is patentable and most research is not 
profitable). Only 1.5% of patents are ever litigated(18). 
bution of a vaccine, for example, will not make 
people less enthusiastic to work and therefore 
decrease overall welfare. It will rather enable peo-
ple to undertake productive endeavours they will 
otherwise not be able to engage in or only pursue 
inefficiently. Having a healthy body and mind are 
the central means of production. A similar rea-
soning applies to labour saving tools that enable 
individuals to produce efficiently. To take an aca-
demic example, there is no social gain in making 
resource-poorer scholars do a manual literature 
search when the same documents exist in digital-
ized and indexed formats. Therefore, a strict pro-
hibition of free-riding – especially when the free-
riding comes at no (or little) real or opportunity 
cost for intellectual property owners – is not in 
line with the utilitarian ideal of having an incen-
tive to enhance the overall well-being.
We proceed with an examination of the limits of 
exclusive rights by discussing an application of a 
Lockean non-wastage proviso to intellectual prop-
erty. 
Applying Lockean non-wastage provisos
As with the other Lockean provisos, the non-
wastage proviso has been subject to widely diverg-
ing interpretations and prolonged dispute(5,21). 
Part of this debate is due to Locke’s alternating 
use of the terms “wasting” and “spoiling” in his 
chapter on property(14). The subsequent discus-
sion on the introduction of money as a tool to 
avoid spoilage pushes contemporary interpreters 
to abandon the non-wastage proviso when apply-
ing Locke’s reasoning to the modern knowledge 
economy, and even more, when dealing with in-
tangibles. Yet, in everyday parlance, we frequently 
say that limiting the accessibility of an object is a 
waste, even though we are preserving the object 
from spoilage. Keeping Hieronymus Bosch’s “The 
Garden of Earthly Delights” in a non-illuminated 
bunker will certainly be a good decision for con-
servation purposes, but under nearly every other 
perspective it would definitely be considered as 
wastage.
Embracing a wider understanding of wastage 
changes how scholars relate to the non-wastage 
proviso. For example, a very broad definition of 
wastage claims that “waste occurs where a unit of a 
 263
Acta Bioethica  2017; 23 (2): 259-269
product of labour is not put to any use”(22:1182). 
The same author indicates that waste cannot only 
occur when potential users are deprived of access, 
but also when possible uses of intangible units 
are hindered(22:1189). Others ponder if massive 
underuse of opportunities may count as wastage 
as well(23,24). Timely use and availability of an 
invention can also be called for by a non-wastage 
proviso(4). Knowledge related to medicines that 
diminish the negative effects of a disease shows its 
highest social value when no vaccines for that dis-
ease exist. 
The imperative of non-wastage would be utterly 
demanding if we follow such an extensive under-
standing. Identifying new opportunities and uses 
comes at a significant cost, as it requires further 
work, which can be quite extensive. Allowing the 
manufacture of generic medicines to serve poorer 
areas requires little extra effort from the inventor, 
yet finding new uses for already developed drug 
demands substantial research effort(25). A full 
examination of additional uses of an idea would 
require almost endless resources.
Nevertheless, allowing people to benefit from in-
ventive endeavours they have not contributed to 
still demands an evaluation of the normative na-
ture of free-riding, to which we proceed.
Variations in the concept of free-riding
Free-riding is generally not perceived as a virtuous 
act. In today’s world the practice of free-riding fac-
es increasingly moral condemnation. A hitchhiker 
is not anymore someone who is making use of a 
resource that would otherwise go to waste (e.g. an 
empty seat during a car ride), but more as some-
one who does not contribute to the fare. Many 
online software applications that allow capitaliz-
ing on such opportunities have become extremely 
popular, e.g. by allowing people to sell empty seats 
on their cars or even nights on an empty sofa. In 
times of BlaBlaCar and Airbnb we have taken as 
a society a long distance from the idyllic world of 
Kerouac’s “On the road”.
In regard to innovation we often hear the story 
of the hard working scientist or artist that loses 
all his potential income by the hand of scrupu-
lous pirates. Ironically, at the same time we can 
observe another familiar picture, the one of the 
profit-thirsty corporation that lets everyone perish 
who is not able to pay for its (life-saving) prod-
ucts. Many ambiguities have to be cleared for an 
ethical evaluation of the concept of free-riding. 
Let us review two characterizations of free-riding. 
The first characterization of free-riding prob-
lematizes the taking of benefits while failing to 
contribute to the existence of a resource. In this 
regard, Brian Barry discusses free-riding as “tak-
ing the benefits … while failing to do one’s part 
in sustaining the practice when it is one’s turn to 
do so”(26:229). In a number of social customs 
reciprocity is expected. In the academic world we 
would condemn someone who repeatedly shows 
up at conferences presenting a paper and expect-
ing feedback, but fails to attend any other presen-
tations but her own.
The second characterization emphasizes the prob-
lem free-riding raises for the creation of a good. 
This perspective is illustrated by the definition of 
free-rider offered by Garrett Cullity(27:5):
“An individual who, in successfully optimizing his 
own interests, does not contribute to the produc-
tion of a good that is in joint supply to a certain 
group, in conditions where it would be collecti-
vely self-interestedly suboptimal for the group not 
to cooperate toward its production”. 
This definition underlines an essential problem 
of goods that allow free-riding. A group can sig-
nificantly improve welfare by pooling resources to 
construct goods everyone in the group will be able 
to enjoy. Some goods, particularly public goods, 
even require a so-called “jointness of production” 
that involves the pooling of material and intangi-
ble resources to come to existence(28). However, 
people differ in their capacities to contribute to a 
common pool, be it with time, capabilities, tools 
or money. We may recall the old socialist saying 
“from each according to their abilities, to each ac-
cording to their needs” to gather a picture of the 
difficulty involved in assessing fair contributions 
and fair takings(29). While we might be able to 
identify who contributes and who does not, it is 
much more difficult and costly to assess who has 
contributed according to her capacities and who 
has not.
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Instead of categorically condemning people who 
are not contributing to the existence of a good de-
spite benefiting from it, we should analyse why 
people are not doing their share. There are three 
often-attributed characteristics to free-riding that 
are crucial to assess when judging the moral nature 
of such behaviour:
• The consumer is voluntarily consuming the 
object of innovation.
• The consumer is not willing to pay the price 
set by the inventor.
• The consumer is harming the inventor by 
free-riding.
Let us examine these three positions by keeping in 
mind that we live in a world of extreme inequa-
lities and that many innovations are crucial for 
subsistence.
Voluntary consumption
When condemning a person for free-riding, we 
often assume that the free-rider is voluntarily con-
suming the object of innovation. From a moral 
perspective, it is important to differentiate if 
someone who consumes an object, has the option 
to choose not to consume it and at what cost this 
decision comes. As mentioned, the case of access 
to essential medicines raises the most prominent 
controversies on patents, in part, because it ques-
tions the voluntariness of consumption. Refusing 
to consume the needed medicines comes at the 
price of jeopardizing one’s health or life. Not offer-
ing the medicines to a loved one comes at the price 
of impeding her chances of healing. Noteworthy 
is that many medicines relieve pain. In the case of 
communicable diseases one can avoid being a vec-
tor for a disease by taking appropriate medicines.
In a number of cases, by bringing into existence an 
invention, the inventor changes the background 
conditions. A world where there is no cure for a 
disease is a different world than a world where 
there is a cure but no access. In the former harm is 
inevitable, in the latter harm is preventable. A so-
ciety that allows the experience of inevitable harm 
is different than one that allows the experience of 
preventable harm. Even in the case where a person 
has strong moral objections to legitimately acquire 
a medicine she needs (e.g. because she finds the 
sales practices of the pharmaceutical company re-
pulsive), she will find it difficult to pretend the 
drug does not exist and ignore the fact that the 
manifestation of the disease is something that is 
preventable. The fear of death or the disease relat-
ed suffering can have a similar effect than torture 
in disrupting the person’s judgement capacities 
and thus the possibility of free consent. Refusing 
the drug is often more than just a difficult choice; 
it can be outside the boundaries of what one has 
the freedom to consent(30). In a similar vein, it is 
different to let someone succumb because death is 
inevitable or avoidable.
Unwillingness to contribute
As mentioned, temporary exclusive rights should 
make it feasible for inventors to recoup reasonable 
development costs for bringing a saleable product 
into existence. The practice that is to be sustained 
is that inventors can expect that their temporary 
exclusive rights are generally respected so to re-
coup the investments needed to elaborate their in-
ventions. Also, by having this certainty, inventors 
can attract investors who are willing to finance the 
development of their ideas.
There are a number of reasons why consumers 
might be unwilling to pay the sum requested by 
the seller of a given invention. Exemplary cases 
include:
• The consumer is unable to contribute.
• The consumer is willing to contribute to the 
total costs of production but not to the higher 
mark-up price.
• The consumer refuses to contribute financia-
lly to the rights holder because of moral con-
cerns.
• The consumer is unwilling to contribute due 
to opportunistic reasons.
Evaluating the reasons why consumers are not 
contributing to the costs of production is essen-
tial to assess the ethical legitimacy of free-riding. 
Therefore, we will look at these four cases in detail.
 265
Acta Bioethica  2017; 23 (2): 259-269
(1) Inability to contribute. People earning less than 
a dollar a day are obviously unable to pay for es-
sential medicines that cost over 10’000 dollars 
a year. People should also have enough money 
left for other essential goods, such as food, after 
paying for the invention. What good is a drug if 
one will starve to death while paying for it? We 
can therefore claim that if after covering all basic 
needs, a person does not have enough money to 
pay for the essential invention; she is obviously 
unable to pay for it. But exactly here we can see 
the beginning of a grey area. At what stage can 
we say that basic needs are sufficiently covered to 
morally oblige someone to pay every remaining 
cent for a medicine?
A further problem is added when the consumer 
could contribute through other means, but the 
inventor fails to offer alternative contribution 
schemes. A person could offer a variety of bodily 
services that benefit society as a whole (e.g. offer 
herself as a human research subject) or serve the 
inventors’ personal interests (with or without los-
ing her dignity). Up to what extent such vulner-
abilities can be legitimately exploited, which may 
include the violation of bodily integrity and losses 
in dignity, is something that can be democratically 
established by limiting freedom of contract(31).
(2) The consumer is willing to contribute to the costs 
of production but not to the higher mark-up price. As 
we saw earlier, inventors can choose between dif-
ferent sales strategies to recoup their research and 
development costs. Inventors are generally free to 
market an invention as a luxury product or as a 
mass product. If the spirit of the patent bargain 
is to offer temporary exclusivity for knowledge 
entering the public domain, people can reason-
ably object to sales practices that seek to limit the 
number of consumers who will enjoy the prod-
uct. Free-riding, as a form of boycotting, gives the 
public a certain leverage to disincentivize “unfair” 
sales practices that do not allow the largest num-
ber of people to benefit from the advancement of 
science.
In many cases taxpayers, public scientists and 
volunteers have contributed to the existence of 
a product. Inventors often benefit from public 
grants(8). The complaint that consumers are pay-
ing twice, by first contributing with their taxes to 
facilitate research and then by buying the research 
product, is often well supported.
Some consumers may consider themselves in a 
special position. A person may consider fair to 
spend a certain amount of her income on medi-
cines. Yet in cases where people suffer multiple 
diseases, they are usually overwhelmingly bur-
dened with medical expenses. Here it is reason-
able to claim a reduction of one’s overall contribu-
tions by arguing that one is already contributing 
a fair share to sustain the practice of advancing 
medical innovation by helping innovators recoup 
their costs. Somewhat more far fetched, but not 
entirely unsound, is the argument a movies buff or 
bookworm may put forward in claiming to suffer 
an expensive taste for diversity over which society 
should make compromises. Many service provid-
ers offer flat rates instead of only pay-per-view 
options, revealing a certain social acceptance of 
the fact that people will benefit differently from a 
particular service despite paying the same. Differ-
ential pricing models may therefore even increase 
the rate consumers judge prices as fair.
(3) The consumer refuses to contribute financially 
to the rights holder because of moral concerns. Con-
sumers boycott companies for a wide variety of 
moral reasons. These reasons are sometimes sup-
ported by society at large, in other cases only 
backed by a small number of concerned citizens 
or interest groups. We may think of calls to boy-
cott non-essential products from pharmaceutical 
companies that refused to offer more accessible 
prices(32). Another example of boycott is the 
wide distribution of copyrighted articles by aca-
demics that morally oppose limitations of access 
to information. 
(4) The consumer is unwilling to contribute due to 
opportunistic reasons. Under this rubric we can find 
the stereotypical free-rider who is condemned by 
many inventors and some of those interested in 
technological advancement. By giving her share, 
this free-rider would help innovators recoup re-
search and development costs, which allows in-
novators to pursue further research. However, the 
innovator is by no means obliged to reinvest her 
earnings in future research activities. She could as 
well cease to put her talent in the service of society 
and spent her earnings in fashion garments and 
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parties. Having done more than her fair share in 
contributing to social welfare, it would be diffi-
cult to reproach such a decision. In practice, many 
innovators continue to do creative work because 
they enjoy inventing. As has been repeatedly said, 
humans are by nature tool-making animals. 
Harming by free-riding 
We often hear that inventors would not produce 
inventions if others are able to copy the invention 
without compensating the inventor. However, 
there are countless cases where people innovate 
– spending resources – without receiving direct 
benefits and even encouraging others to make use 
of their inventions. Not only that, we can find 
new legal tools that allow inventors to share their 
creative efforts without the fear that these will end 
up exclusively appropriated. Creative commons 
licenses are designed to keep innovations in the 
public domain(33). 
Taking a much more optimistic perspective on 
human nature, James Wilson notes that “[t]he fact 
that others can [...] benefit from their work need 
not provide a disincentive for them, and if they are 
even moderately altruistic may provide an incen-
tive”(34:455). Foreseeably not having the oppor-
tunity to recoup research and development costs 
cannot in itself qualify as harm. Harm may how-
ever occur if the inventors innovates and makes 
investments based on the legitimate assumption 
that she will be able to recoup these cost using 
existing intellectual property regimes. An abrupt 
change of the rules of the game may indeed cause 
harm, as innovation often requires long-term in-
vestments.
There are a variety of ways free-riders may cause 
actual or potential harm to inventors. The non-
contributing consumer of objects of innovation 
may cause the following effects:
• Produces no harm.
• Sets a bad example.
• Allows price referencing.
• Deprives the innovator from a potential inco-
me possibility. 
• Hinders investment when it is rational for all 
to cooperate.
• Demotivates innovators.
• Let’s review these outcomes.
In the first case, where the inventor suffers no 
harm, we have the situation where the free-rider 
is not able to contribute and consumes the good 
without the knowledge of others. By definition, 
this type of free-rider cannot improve the situa-
tion of the inventor since she has no transferable 
assets to offer as compensation.5 Innovations, as 
understood here, are of non-rivalrous consump-
tion and therefore free-riding does not make the 
inventor worse off. When the free-rider consumes 
the product without other people’s knowledge she 
does not produce the effect of providing a “bad 
example”. There are also cases where the free-rider 
is a member of a special group invited to benefit 
from the good without contributing to its exist-
ence. For example, a number of companies offer 
access to their objects of innovation through hu-
manitarian licences for Least Developed Coun-
tries.
The second case condemns individual free-riding 
for its likely effect of tempting others to also fail to 
contribute to the practice of compensating inno-
vators. Laws become increasingly more expensive 
and difficult to enforce the more people ignore 
these and the more socially acceptable it is to vio-
late them. A paradigmatic case is corruption(35).
As a third case, we can name price referencing. If 
the inventor agrees to make some price reductions 
to the poor, richer customers will gain a better in-
sight of the true cost of production and thus will 
also demand for price cuts by referring to the price 
poorer customers are paying. This strategy is often 
used by countries of the Global North with uni-
versal healthcare insurance(36).
The fourth case entails the opportunities lost for 
financial gain involved in free-rides. In this cat-
egory, we have to distinguish cases where consum-
5 This is not completely true for the cases of medicines. Markets 
for medicines without universal health coverage raise a perverse 
incentive: people who do not have access to drugs can serve as 
disease vectors. When a disease remains prevalent in an area future 
demand for medicines, and thus profits, is secured(12). 
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ers considered paying the sales price of the prod-
uct and ended up not paying it, and those where 
consumers are only using the good because they 
can have free access to it. To exemplify, an early 
career researcher might plan to buy a particular 
paperback book but change her mind when she 
manages to get an illegal copy. In the case she is 
looking for an article on a particular subject, and 
the only option to access a candidate article is to 
pay 40 dollars to get a first glance to see if the 
article is really useful, she most likely will consult 
other options that she can more readily access (e.g. 
an open access repository). It would be derisory 
to claim that every illicit download amounts to a 
40-dollar loss. 
The fifth case names instances where research and 
development activities were terminated or never 
carried out because of the low possibilities to re-
coup costs. Here we do not have only cases where 
patents are ignored, but also cases where research is 
not patentable. A special case are so-called second-
ary use indications for medicines, where research 
shows (or could prove) that existing medicines 
whose patent has expired can treat other diseases 
or dysfunctions. The inability to recoup such re-
search costs impedes proving clinical efficacy(25). 
The sixth case addresses the problem where an 
inventive egoists ceases to produce inventions 
because she disapproves that others benefit from 
her intellectual labour without adequately remu-
nerating her efforts. To take this case seriously we 
would have to balance the egoist inventor’s inter-
ests with the highly altruistic inventor’s interests 
along with society’s interests. In the case we face 
the crude reality that people only make use of 
their talents when they are able to grasp as much 
benefits as possible without regard to other peo-
ple’s wellbeing, utilitarian reasoning may demand 
that we concede the egoists demands, especially 
for innovations that can address welfare issues.  
Concluding remarks
Let us go back to our original question and exam-
ine if we can provide a satisfactory answer. Do we 
have a moral right to collect the fruits of the la-
bour an inventor fails to collect? An imperative to 
reduce wastage invites us to answer this question 
positively. By making use of opportunities the in-
ventor fails to exploit, we are reducing wastage of 
valuable opportunities to reduce harm. However, 
we also saw that free-riding may jeopardize invest-
ment in inventive enterprises and limits the pos-
sibilities to enjoy the fruits of one’s labour, which 
may demotivate or even impede some types of 
innovation. After considering both sides, we will 
have to settle for a balance of both public and pri-
vate interests. 
In how far free-riding is innovation deterring is 
ultimately an empirical question to which philos-
ophy has little to say. From a normative perspec-
tive we should however note, that the consumer 
of objects of innovation does in many instances 
not only satisfies personal needs but also produces 
a series of social benefits. We mentioned the case 
of user innovation. People who treat with medi-
cines communicable diseases reduce their propa-
gation(37). Citizens who digested large amounts 
of information are in a better position to make 
socially beneficial voting decision. The licit and 
illicit use of labour saving tools produce a larger 
output. 
Since the innovator does not compensate every 
single source of inspiration or ideas, it would be 
unfair to demand that consumers have to fully 
compensate every single creative effort they ab-
sorb. Insisting in a strict market exchange of ideas 
would increase enormously transaction costs, 
which undermines higher societal goals such as 
the improvement of welfare and the maintenance 
and creation of an innovation-promoting environ-
ment. 
What implications should we draw from these ob-
servations for the unconstrained use of exclusive 
rights by innovators? Since it is hardly possible 
for inventors and consumers to compensate every 
single source of ideas and musings, we should re-
popularize and re-establish fair use clauses as well 
as grant wider research exemptions. Further, we 
need a more active protection of the public do-
main. Access to information within the public 
domain should not be hindered to avoid possible 
infringements of copyright or patents. As a trade-
off, consumers should make a larger effort in pro-
viding innovators with quality feedback on their 
products. It is counterproductive and detrimental 
for society to insist that every benefit one harvests 
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from other people’s creative effort should be com-
pensated.
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